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European Central Bank working paper series 66ABSTRACT
This paper uses a large panel of bilateral bank ﬂow data to assess how institutions and politics
aﬀect international capital -bank in particular- ﬂows. The following key ﬁndings emerge: 1)T h e
empirical "gravity" model is the benchmark in explaining the volume of international banking
activities. 2) Conditioned on standard gravity factors (distance, GDP, population), well-functioning
institutions are a key driving force for international bank ﬂows. Speciﬁcally, foreign banks invest
substantially more in countries with i) uncorrupt bureaucracies, ii) high-quality legal system, and
iii) a non-government controlled banking system. 3) Beyond institutions, politics exert also a ﬁrst-
order impact. 4) The European Integration process has spurred cross-border banking activities
between member states. These results are robust to various econometric methodologies, samples
and the potential endogeneity of institutional characteristics. The strong institutions/politics-bank
ﬂows nexus has strong implications for asset trade and international macro theories, which have
not modelled these relationships explicitly.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F34, F21, G21, K00
Keywords: banks, capital ﬂows, institutions, law and ﬁnance, politics
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One of the key and most controversial characteristics of the recent wave of globalization
has been the spike in cross-border ﬁnancial ﬂows. Capital ﬂows have been recently regarded
both as a remedy and a curse for emerging countries economic setbacks. The association of
capital ﬂow volatility with recent episodes of ﬁnancial turmoil have challenged the theoreti-
cally sound capital ﬂows-development link. Understanding therefore the underlying factors
that inﬂuence the behavior of foreign investors is vital. In addition it is particularly useful to
investigate whether high-quality institutions and political stability play any role in pulling
foreign capital. The IMF and the World Bank, for example, have constantly urged their
members to implement institutional reforms, tackle corruption, improve their bureaucracy
and privatize state-owned enterprises to attract foreign capital.
Using quarterly data on gross bilateral banking transactions from nineteen to ﬁfty-one
countries during the last twenty years, the panel estimates show that besides geography
and income level, politics and institutions are the key determinants of international bank-
ing activities. Speciﬁcally, employing various panel methodologies, the analysis reveals the
following key results:
1. A "gravity" equation predicting that bank ﬂows between two countries are positively
associated to their "size" (proxied by population and GDP) and inversely related to
their "distance" (that captures transaction and information costs) is a powerful bench-
mark in analyzing cross-border banking activities.
2. When the "gravity" model is augmented with a subjective measure of institutional
quality and political stability (ICRG "political risk") it can explain more than half
of the overall variability in the volume of bilateral bank lending. The role of insti-
tutions/political risk in attracting cross-border bank capital is also economically very
large. A one percent decrease in political risk in the capital recipient country is on
average associated with a two percent spike in the volume of cross-border bank lending.
3. To investigate whether it is politics or institutions the key in explaining foreign bank
liquidity, I try to separate the two eﬀects estimating gravity models, where both the
5
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 437
February 2005composite political risk measure and speciﬁc institutional indicators jointly enter the
speciﬁcation. The results suggest that both sound policies and well-functioning institu-
tions exert a signiﬁcant role in attracting foreign bank investment. When I investigate
exactly which institutional structures inﬂuence foreign bank lending, the estimates
show that foreign banks are unwilling to allocate capital in countries:
(a) With corrupt and ineﬃcient bureaucracies.
(b) With poor investor protection and slow judicial process.
(c) Where the government owns and controls the domestic banking system.
4. The empirical analysis also reveals some additional interesting patterns:
(a) The elimination of exchange rate risk and the harmonization of banking regulation
that has taken place within the European Union has spurred cross-border banking
activities between member states by approximately 50%.
(b) The quantitatively large institutional and politics eﬀect applies both to developed
and emerging countries.
(c) Asset and liability ﬂows are strong complements, since the same institutional and
political factors that inﬂuence gross investment ﬂows, aﬀect ﬁnancing ﬂows.
From a theoretical standpoint, the results thus oﬀer a middle-ground approach to the
ongoing debate on whether law (La Porta et al., 1998) or politics (Rajan and Zingales, 2003)
is the key in explaining ﬁnancial patterns around the world. The results also suggest that
theoretical work on international capital movements needs to explicitly model the interrela-
tions between institutional quality, political stability and capital ﬂows. The strong institu-
tion/politics capital ﬂows nexus, also hints to a likely mechanism through which well-deﬁned
and enforced institutions contribute to economic growth.
The policy-implications of the results are also considerable: Policy reforms, like power
decentralization, democratizations, and privatization, and structural policies aiming to im-
prove ineﬃcient bureaucracies, tackle corruption, and enhance legal system competence are
rewarded by foreign banks, who invest substantially more in investor-friendly countries.
Therefore such policies can spur investment and growth opportunities, by enhancing the
liquidity of ﬁnancial intermediaries.
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Cross-border capital ﬂows have skyrocketed in the last decades. Such capital movements
have been regarded by policy-makers and academics as both an anathema and a panacea
to both emerging and developed countries structural problems (Obstfeld, 1998). There is,
however, little empirical work on what drives international liquidity. Even less work exists
on the role of institutions and politics in explaining cross-border capital movements. This is
most likely due to the absence of well-developed theory and data problems regarding both
capital ﬂow and institutions. The present study uses newly compiled institutional quality
indicators, merges them with one of the oldest and more complete datasets of bilateral
capital ﬂows (BIS Locational Banking Statistics) and provides an empirical investigation of
how various types of institutional arrangements impact cross-border bank ﬂows.
This paper’s contribution is twofold: First, it adds to the fast-growing literature on the
determinants of international capital movementss (e.g. Wei, 2000; Mody, Razin, and Sadka,
2003; Portes and Rey, forthcoming), by studying the driving forces of international bank-
ing activities. Second, and most importantly, it provides the ﬁrst comprehensive empirical
study of how the overall institutional and political environment inﬂuences the volume of
international capital transactions.
Using quarterly observations on gross bilateral banking transactions from nineteen ("source")
to ﬁfty-one ("recipient") countries from the mid-eighties until 2002 and employing various
panel methodologies, the estimates show that geography, politics and institutions are key
determinants of international banking activities. The "gravity" equation that is highly suc-
cessful in empirical trade studies, which models asset ﬂows as function of the distance be-
tween the two countries and their "size", appears to be a powerful benchmark for analyzing
cross-border bank ﬂows as well. The power of the "gravity" speciﬁcation sharply increases,
however, when augmented with a measure of the overall quality of the institutional and
political environment (ICRG political risk rating). Not only is the political risk measure
highly signiﬁcant, but the empirical model can explain more than half of gross bilateral
bank ﬂows variability, even at the noisy quarterly frequency. The economic magnitude of
the results is strong. Controlling for unobserved country characteristics and exploiting the
"within" country variation, the estimates suggest that a ﬁve percent political risk decline in
the capital recipient country is associated with an almost two percent rise in bilateral bank
lending volume. Other panel methodologies produce even larger eﬀects.
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institutional indicator exactly captures, I try to "unbundle" institutions by quantifying the
eﬀect of speciﬁc institutional characteristics on international banking activities. The analysis
reveals interesting new regularities: i) A corrupt bureaucracy acts like a tax and discourages
foreign banking investment. ii) Banks appear unwilling to invest in countries with ineﬃcient
legal systems, most likely because agency costs are ampliﬁed. Quantitatively, a 10 percent
improvement in the time to complete a simple legal case in the recipient country is followed
by an approximate 3 percent rise in the volume of bilateral bank ﬂows. iii)C o r p o r a t e
governance practices are also quite important, and government ownership of the banking
sector strongly hampers foreign bank investment. iv) European Union (EU) membership
has substantially increased cross-border banking activities among member-states, most likely
through banking law harmonization and the minimization of exchange risk.
There is, however, an ongoing debate on whether law or politics is the key driving force
of ﬁnancial development (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 2003). To assess if foreign banks’ key
consideration when making their capital allocation decisions is political stability or institu-
tional performance, I also estimate speciﬁcations including both the political risk and the
speciﬁc institutional proxies simultaneously. The results suggest that politics and institu-
tions are both key determinants of international capital transactions having thus somewhat
independent eﬀects.
This new evidence on a strong link between institutions and politics and international
bank ﬂows link is signiﬁcant in a number of dimensions.
First, the bank ﬂow dataset employed includes not only international inter-bank activ-
ities, but also debt, equity and direct investment ﬂows. The results have thus a broader
interpretation and call for more research on the role of institutions in other types of capital
ﬂows.
Second, understanding the determinants of ﬁnancial intermediaries’ liquidity in a glob-
alized world can enhance our knowledge about the mechanisms of ﬁnancial and economic
development. Recent work has shown that the banking sector’s liquidity has a causal eﬀect
on economic growth (see Levine, 2004, for a review). Since foreign lending is required espe-
cially by capital-scarce countries to ﬁnance domestic investment, it is of great importance to
understand what drives international bank ﬂows.
Third, capital ﬂo w sh a v eb e e na tt h ec o r eo ft h es o - c a l l e d (original) Washington consensus
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more serious institutional transformation" (Rodrik, 2004). In spite of evidence linking capi-
tal ﬂows to sizable increases in domestic investment and growth (Bosworth and Collins, 1999;
Razin, 2002), their role in generating recent ﬁnancial crises has cast doubt on the beneﬁts of
capital account liberalization. The "crisis leading indicators" studies have revealed a strong
connection between the volume of capital (and speciﬁcally bank) ﬂows and recent crises.1
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003), for example, demonstrate that contagion spreads pri-
marily through banking centers. Understanding what drives international banking activities
can therefore shed light on one of the hottest debates in international economics.
Fourth, analyzing gross international transactions may reveal information about aggre-
gate holdings and net ﬂo w s .T h el i t e r a t u r eo nt h e" home bias puzzle" (see Lewis, 1999, for
recent review) has examined numerous potential explanations. These include transportation
costs in the goods market (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 2000), along with information and other
frictions in asset trading (Martin and Rey, 2004).2 Although the importance of institutions,
especially the law and corruption, has also been considered, not much work has been con-
ducted quantifying the importance of institutional quality and political stability in resolving
this question. A related puzzle is why capital does not ﬂow from rich to poor countries (Lu-
cas, 1990). Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) model how agency costs stemming from ineﬃcient
corporate governance and law enforcement mechanisms impede foreign capital ﬂowing to
capital-scarce countries. This paper’s results suggest that not only do poor countries receive
substantially less net inward investment, as recent studies show (Alfaro et al., 2003), but
they participate less in the international capital market. My results thus not only directly
validate Shleifer and Wolfenzon, but also reveal additional institutional and political risk
characteristics that explain a big part of this low participation.
Fifth, the results have direct policy implications. Political reforms, such as privatiza-
tion or democratization (which are associated with a substantial decline in "political risk"),
can signiﬁcantly increase the liquidity of domestic ﬁnancial intermediaries, fostering local
investment.
1See, for example, Frankel and Rose (1996) and Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001) for empirics and
theory linking capital ﬂows to the likelihood of ﬁnancial crises.
2In a recent paper Engel and Matsumoto (2004) oﬀer an alternative intuitive explanation to the home
bias puzzle. In their new Keynesian DGE model sticky prices generate a negative correlation between labor
income and domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁts and equity returns. Consequently domestic agents hold domestic equities,
since they are a good hedge against future income and productivity shocks.
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vious related work and discuss the channels through which institutions and politics aﬀect
international ﬁnancial ﬂows. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and the data.
Section 4 provides a preliminary analysis of the panel descriptives. Section 5 presents the
main regression results: It ﬁrst examines the eﬀect of institutional quality, broadly deﬁned,
in explaining gross international bank ﬂows. Second, it quantiﬁes the impact of speciﬁc insti-
tutional characteristics (namely legal system quality, corruption, and government ownership
of banks), controlling for both political and economic risk. Section 6 gives some additional
evidence. Section 7 presents sensitivity checks, addressing concerns arising from omitted
variables, endogeneity, measurement error and data quality. Section 8 concludes, oﬀering
some directions for future research.
2 Related literature & why institutions matter
2.1 Previous empirical work
This paper relates and adds new evidence to two distinguishable areas of research: First is
the literature on the determinants of cross-border capital movements.3 Studies by Portes
and Rey (forthcoming) on equity, Mody, Razin, and Sadka (2003) on FDI, and Buch (2000)
on bank ﬂows have demonstrated that the "gravity" model successfully simulates not only
goods, but also asset trade. The literature has thus far concentrated on the role of geog-
raphy and information asymmetries in explaining asset trade. Although information costs
could be correlated or magniﬁed with poorly performing institutions, research has to a large
extent ignored the role institutional and political characteristics play in international capital
movements. A notable exception is Shang-Jin Wei’s work. Wei (2000), for example, shows
that corruption exerts a distortionary role to FDI. Likewise, Wei and Gelos (2002) show that
emerging market funds invest systematically less in less transparent countries. Since the
dataset employed contains not only inter-bank loans, but also substantial amounts of FDI
and equity ﬂows, the results hint that a key missing input of previous capital ﬂow studies
were politics and other institutional characteristics (legal system quality, government control
of ﬁnancial intermediaries, corporate governance).4
3A third distinct literature has focused on US banks’ international extension of credit (e.g. Goldberg and
Johnson, 1990; Dahl and Shrieves, 1999). Institutions and politics are absent from those studies.
4Portes and Rey (forthcoming)d i dn o tﬁnd a signiﬁcnat eﬀect of some corporate governance and trans-
parency measures in explaining cross-border equity ﬂows.
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Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999), numerous studies have established a strong causal eﬀect of
the quality of legal system on ﬁnancial development. Well-deﬁned and protected investors’
rights appear to be a prerequisite for liquid capital markets (La Porta et al. 1997), merger
and acquisition activity (Rossi and Volpin, forthcoming), and large project ﬁnance deals
(Esty and Megginson, forthcoming). Recently, however, alternative to legal system factors
have been considered. Stulz and Williamson (2003), for example, show that cultural charac-
teristics (religion, societal composition, language) perform better than legal quality proxies
in explaining ﬁnancial patterns across the world. Rajan and Zingales (2003) emphasize the
role of politics (protectionism, lobbying) in ﬁnancial development. Not only are my results in
accord with these insights, but they also reveal a synthetic approach. The panel regressions
imply that both legal system quality and politics are key driving forces of the volume of in-
ternational bank ﬂows.5 Culture plays also an important role, since countries with common
historical, colonial, or religious ties engage much more in bilateral banking activities.
2.2 Why institutions matter for gross cross-border bank transac-
tion ﬂows: Channels and theory
Political risk and institutional quality strongly aﬀect foreign investors (banks in the present
study) behavior. But where does this eﬀect come from?
First, low quality institutions are associated with poor economic performance. Previous
studies have documented a negative eﬀect of corruption, inadequate property rights, and
investor protection on both GDP growth (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995) and
growth volatility (Acemoglu et al., 2003). Likewise, Bai and Wei (2000) present evidence
that weak institutions lower government’s ability to collect taxes and consequently lead to
ineﬃcient macro policies (such as protectionist measures and high inﬂation).
Second, political instability and corruption can cancel any beneﬁts of international banks
arising from higher expected returns. Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1996a,b) and Perotti
and van Oijen (2001) have shown that political instability (reﬂected in the same composite
political risk measure as the one this paper employs) is followed by lower stock returns.
Johnson et al. (2000) show that corporate governance measures perform better than standard
5In a closely related paper that is complementary to the present paper, Qian and Strahan (2004) show
that the legal system explains the design of international bank contracts.
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crisis.
Third, poor institutional performance can amplify asset trade frictions. Du and Wei
(2004) and Bhattacharya and Daouk (2003), for example, show that high levels of corruption
are correlated with higher insider trading activities. In contrast, a high quality legal system
minimizes monitoring costs. Corporate transparency and advanced accounting standards
mitigate information costs, while bureaucratic and legal eﬃciency alleviates agency costs by
settling disputes arising from contract incompleteness. Large agency costs make the eﬀective
production technology less eﬃcient and as a result foreign investors are unwilling to lend to
countries marked by a poorly functioning legal system. Therefore international banks might
be unwilling to bear these costs inspite of some potential gains from higher returns and
increased portfolio devitriﬁcation opportunities.
Yet little theory exists directly linking foreign investment with political stability and
institutional quality. Even less work exists modeling the role of institutions and politics for
international banking speciﬁcally. Models of international asset trade have analyzed legal
system ineﬃciencies, corruption, or low transparency in the broad context of "transaction"
costs.6 The most closely related theoretical work to the present study comes thus from
the corporate ﬁnance literature. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) build an agency model in
which an entrepreneur has a proﬁtable project and seeks external ﬁnance. The entrepreneur
maximizes her personal wealth, which is a function of the fraction of the project she decides
to maintain, the project’s proﬁtability, and the amount she is able to divert. Diversion in
turn depends on the eﬃcacy of the legal system; looting becomes costly with well-deﬁned
and protected investor’s rights. Both domestic and foreign investors, ex ante, anticipate the
probability of diversion and are thus unwilling to invest in low quality legal environment
countries. Consequently, capital does not ﬂow from capital-abundant countries to countries
with low levels of investor protection. The present study’s results demonstrate a strong
causal eﬀect of legal system eﬀectiveness indicators on the volume of cross—border lending
activities. The results also indicate that what it really matters for international banks is the
actual, de facto, quality of the legal system rather how well the securities legislation or the
commercial code protects investors.
6See, for example, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) and the associated discussion, particularly Charles Engel’s
(2000) comments. Maurice Obstfeld also admitted that costs can be interpreted quite broadly, including
language costs and legal system ineﬃciencies.
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3.1 Gravity Speciﬁcation
To quantify the eﬀect of institutions and political conditions on cross-border bank ﬂows, I
rely on the "gravity" model. As Portes and Rey have argued, an empirical gravity equa-
tion for ﬁnancial ﬂows arises naturally from international macro models (e.g. Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ, 2000; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2003). Distance captures either transaction costs
in the goods market or asymmetric information in the asset market. Since I focus here on
institutions rather than in information, I only use the distance variable and do not augment
the speciﬁcation with any speciﬁc information variables. Following Martin and Rey’s (2004)
representative agent model of asset ﬂows, "size" is proxied by (the logarithms of) real per
capita GDP and population.7 I augment the "gravity" equation with composite institu-
tional quality proxies, speciﬁc institutional indicators, along with geographical and cultural
variables. The exact speciﬁcation for my analysis takes the following form:
ln(Fi,j,t)=β1 ln(Yi,t)+β2 ln(Yj,t)+β3 ln(POP i,t)+β4 ln(POPj,t)+
β5 ln(AREAi)+β6 ln(AREAj)+β7 ln(DISTi,j)+β8TIE i,j +
γINSTj,t−1 + Φ1OTHERi,t + Φ2OTHERj,t + at + εi,j,t
where i and j indicate the "source"a n d" recipient" country respectively and t denotes
time (quarter). The variables are deﬁned as:
• ln(Fi,j,t) is the natural logarithm of gross asset ﬂows from banks located in country i
to all sectors (banking and non-banking) in country j in quarter t.
• Y is real per capita GDP.
• POP is total population.
7In contrast to Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000), who build a model that generates substantial amounts of home
bias by introducing transaction costs solely in the goods market, Martin and Rey (2004) add frictions in the
asset market. In their set-up, demand for country A’s assets is separated between domestic and external.
External demand from country B for assets in A is inversely related to (asset) transaction costs. These
costs include ﬁnancial intermediaries’ fees and hedging expenses, along with information and consequently
monitoring costs. In addition, demand from country B for assets in A are a function of the size of domestic
(country A) capital markets, since a larger market implies better diversiﬁcation opportunities. Finally, ﬂows
from B to A are larger the larger the population in B.
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• TIE i,j is a dummy variable that takes on the value one when i and j have common
colonial ties or speak the same language.
• ln(AREA) denotes the logarithm of the land area (in square kilometers).
• INSTj,t−1 denotes the ICRG composite institutional indicator (political risk) for the
recipient country (j) in the previous quarter t − 1.8
• OTHER denotes various other (time invariant and time varying) controls at the source
(i) and recipient country (j).
• The speciﬁcation also includes time ﬁxed-eﬀects (at) to capture unobserved time het-
erogeneity and the upward trend in the volume of cross border activities.
• β,γ, and φ are vectors of parameters to be estimated, while εi,j,t is a Gaussian white
noise error term.
The speciﬁcation resembles Portes and Rey (forthcoming), Wei (2000), Portes, Rey and
Oh (2001), and Mody, Razin and Sadka (2003), who study other forms of international
bilateral capital movements.9
3.2 Data
My dataset consists of quarterly observations, starting from the ﬁrst quarter of 1984 until
the end of 2002. The data can be separated into three categories: i) the cross-border bank
ﬂow data (Fi,j,t), ii) institutional performance measures, INSTj,t−1 (composite and speciﬁc),
and iii) data on other controls.
3.2.1 Dependent Variable - Bank Flows
Data on bank ﬂows is taken from the Bank of International Settlement’s (BIS) International
Locational Banking Statistics (IBS). The BIS IBS database reports aggregate assets (and
8Using the contemporaneous value does not alter the results. The lagged value is used to (partly) address
simultaneity. In the robustness section, I formally address the issue of endogeneity employing IV estimators.
9T h er e s u l t sa r en o ts e n s i t i v et od i ﬀerent gravity speciﬁcations. In a previous version of the paper I
employed a model with multiplicative gravity terms (e.g. Rose and Spiegel, 2002; Rose, 2004). The results
are quantitatively very similar.
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countries ("the vis-à-vis countries").10 Due to insuﬃcient coverage for many "host"c o u n t r i e s
and 17 (mainly developing and "oﬀ-shore" centres) "source" countries the present study
analyzes ﬂows from 19 (i)t o51 (j) countries. The "source" nations are ﬁnancially developed,
while "vis-a-vis" nations include both OECD and developing (and some underdeveloped)
states. Appendix A lists all sample countries.
Data includes most of banks’ on-balance sheet exposure and captures cross-border loans
and deposits, debt securities, and other assets. Speciﬁcally, the dataset includes not only
inter-bank lending (deposits, loans and trade-related credit), but also "covers portfolio and
direct investment ﬂows" (BIS, 2003a). Flows are estimated by the BIS as the exchange rate
adjusted changes in total assets (and liabilities).11 Appendix B provides a more detailed
analysis of the Locational Banking Statistics data-base and gives precise deﬁnitions of the
dependent variable(s) employed in the study.12
3.2.2 Composite & Speciﬁc Institutional Indicators
I use as institutional environment’s proxy, the composite indicator constructed by Political
Risk Services (PRS), namely the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) "political risk"
rating.13 In contrast to most institutional measures that are purely cross-sectional or ex-
hibit limited time-variability, the political risk rating (INST) exhibits substantial "within"
variation. This enables me to address the following key policy question: Controlling for
10However, due to the hub nature of international banking activities, the data covers almost all interna-
tional bank lending. The BIS reports that countries are asked to contribute only "....when their cross—border
banking business becomes substantial." (p.5. BIS 2003b)
11A concern with previous versions of the BIS data was how to construct ﬂows from the stock data.
Simply taking ﬁrst diﬀerences could be very misleading, since a devaluation either at the "source"o ra tt h e
"recipient" country might cause a sharp increase or decrease in total assets, even if no capital movements have
taken place. Since reporting countries report the currency in which the assets and liabilities are denominated,
the BIS has constructed an estimate of the ﬂows, which I employ as my dependent variable. As the BIS
acknowledge, this adjusting is not perfect, since ﬂows might have occurred at diﬀerent exchange rates (see
for more details Wooldridge, 2002). However, it is the best proxy possible and far better than attempts to
individually construct ﬂows (e.g. Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2003).
12Unfortunately there are many zeros in the data, which makes the logarithmic transformation impossible.
In the robustness section, I address the excess zeros and missing observations problem and show that the
importance of institutions in cross-border bank ﬂows is robust. Other limitations of the dataset [which are
common to capital ﬂows studies] are: i) the data do not capture indirect exposure to recipient countries,
and ii)i n s u ﬃcient coverage of "oﬀ-balance sheet" exposure.
13Political Risk Services (PRS) is a risk rating corporation. Although measurement error might be present,
it is exactly the type of data that institutional investors, like banks, take into account, when making their
asset allocation decisions. In Section 7.3, I formally address issues arising from measurement error employing
instrumental variables (IV) techniques.
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improvement associated with an increased volume of international capital movements? In
addition it is reported at a monthly basis and can be directly merged with the BIS quar-
terly data. Finally PRS started reporting this measure in the early eighties (1984), perfectly
matching the BIS starting date.14
The "Political Risk" rating is a composite index of political, legal, social, and bureau-
cratic institutions. It is based on PRS staﬀ subjective assessment of various institutional
arrangements and ranges from zero to one hundred (with lower values suggesting poorly
performing institutions). Although this measure (and various of its subcomponents) have
long been used by the empirical macro literature (e.g. Hall and Jones, 1999; Knack and
Keefer, 1995), only recently has it been employed by studies analyzing international invest-
ment patterns.15 Alfaro, et al. (2003) use this index to assess institutions’ impact on net
inward investment, while Gelos and Wei (2002) employ it to explain the portfolio allocation
choice of emerging market funds.
Yet it is not crystal-clear what such a composite rating captures. Perotti and Van Oi-
jen (2001), for example, show a strong correlation between the political risk rating and
privatization policies, while Alfaro et al. (2003) with democracy measures. To solve the
institutions quality vs. politics question, which has attracted recently a considerable debate,
I will present results with both the political risk rating and with more speciﬁc measures
of institutional quality.16 For the latter, I exploit recently compiled datasets on legal and
bureaucratic quality. I proxy the quality of laws and corporate governance practices with
the widely-used anti-director’s rights index (La Porta et al., 1998). For legal system perfor-
mance I rely on two measures compiled by Djankov et al. (2003): i) a measure of contract
enforceability and ii) the time it takes to evict a tenant for nonpayment. Measures of the
structure and proﬁtability of the banking sector are taken form La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
14Actually the BIS dataset starts in 1977. Data coverage during the ﬁrst decade, however, is limited to a
couple of industrial countries.
15Hall and Jones (1999) decompose the ICRG "political risk" index and use only the scores on i)l a wa n d
order, ii) bureaucratic quality, iii) corruption, iv) risk of expropriation, and v) government repudiation of
contracts. They label this measure "Government Anti-diversion Policies" index. The index I use is broader
since it includes religious tensions, war, ethnic conﬂict, etc. For more details see Panel of Appendix B.
16See Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) for an eﬀort to "unbundle" institutions and empirically quantify the
impact of speciﬁc institutional characteristics on economic development. For such analysis, one would ideally
like to use the various sub-indicators of the political-risk indicator (see Appendix B). However, PRS does not
report the sub-components of these ratings at a quarterly frequency. Thus I rely on other variables that are
not the actual sub-components of the political risk rating, but capture the same institutional characteristics.
By doing so, I (partly) address the potential measurement error of the political risk rating.
16
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index.
3.2.3 Other
Common language, ethnolinguistic, and geographical variables included in the gravity model
originally come from the CIA Factbook and have been retrieved from Andrew Rose’s web-
page. GDP, population and other macro variables are taken from the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics. To control for macroeconomic and ﬁnancial sector developments, I also
utilize the other two risk ratings produced by ICRG, the "economic" and "ﬁnancial" risk
measures. Appendix B provides the sources and detailed deﬁnitions of all variables employed.
4 Preliminary Evidence
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics, while Table 2 provides the correlation matrix of the
variables employed in the regression analysis. Cross-country institutional performance diﬀers
enormously. For example, Canada, Chile, and the United Kingdom get (a score of) 5 in the
(0 − 6 scale) anti-director’s rights index, while Belgium gets a 0, and Germany and Italy a
disappointing 1. The variability of the de facto legal quality indicators (contract enforceabil-
ity and eviction time) is even higher. For example in ten sample-countries it takes more than
a year to enforce one of the simplest legal cases, tenant eviction for nonpayment.17 Likewise,
the zero to ten contract enforceability index, which is based on the rigidity and formality of
the legal system ranges from 4.29 in Indonesia and Peru to almost 9 in Switzerland.
The composite institutional index ranges from 33 (in the Philippines in the ﬁrst quar-
ter of 1991) to 97 (in Switzerland and the Netherlands in various periods). The "within"
country variation, which is particularly desirable in a panel context, is also substantial: The
Philippines, for example, begin in 1984 with a low score of 38. After Marcos regime collapse,
however, the Philippines experience a notable institutional-political improvement. This is
reﬂected to the political risk measure, which increased to 76 (end of 1997) and then fell to 65
(at the end of 2002). The political risk rating is, in turn, highly correlated with corruption
and contract enforceability (correlations above 0.70), although these variables are taken from
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alternative sources (not PRS) and enter with just a 4% loading (see Appendix B).The correlation structure suggests a notable association between the composite institu-
tional index and bank ﬂows. The ICRG "political risk" index is substantially correlated with
ﬂows both in assets and liabilities (correlations of 0.31 and 0.34 respectively). Figure 1 plots
the cross country scatter of aggregate bank ﬂows against the mean composite institutions
index and illustrates a clear positive association. A similar relationship between gross bank-
ing transactions and corruption and legal system quality is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3
respectively.
5 Benchmark Results
I begin by estimating the gravity model using plain OLS (pooling cross-section and time-
series). I then show that the results are robust to alternative panel methodologies that
potentially correct for unobserved individual characteristics and residual autocorrelation.
Throughout the regression analysis, t statistics based on standard errors adjusted for clus-
tered panel-wise (country pairs) heteroskedasticity are reported.18 First, I concentrate on
the time-varying composite institutions index (ICRG "political risk" indicator). Second, I
quantify the eﬀect of particular institutional arrangements on cross-border bank lending.
5.1 Political Risk-Composite Institutional Indicator
5.1.1 Pooled OLS
Table 3 presents the benchmark OLS estimates. The "gravity" model works well in several
dimensions. First, the model ﬁts the data quite well. One can explain more than forty
percent of the overall variability in gross bilateral bank ﬂows just with standard gravity
factors (namely distance, ethnolinguistic ties, land area, income, population and per capita
GDP). This is lower than in goods’ trade studies (where the R2 is around 0.65), but quite
high for (typically noisy) quarterly data. Second, in all perturbations the "gravity" terms
consistently enter with stable and well-behaved coeﬃcients. Distance, for example, has a
18Regression diagnostics indicate no serious mis-speciﬁcation problems. Box-Cox tests suggest that the
usually applied in gravity models logarithmic transformation is quite reasonable (λ = .028). There are also
no evidence of non-stationarity. Correcting for clustered heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation yields large
standard errors (compared to either standard Huber-White or Newey-West standard errors) and thus the
reported t-statistics are the most conservative.
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though it might be puzzling to interpret a negative eﬀect of distance on asset trade, since
transaction fees are typically small, distance seems to proxy well for information asymme-
tries and other non-standard costs.19 Having linguistic, historical or colonial ties increases
bilateral bank ﬂows considerably, suggesting that culture and trust have a role in ﬁnancial
patterns. The coeﬃcients on the "size" measures are positive and signiﬁcant. Richer and
ﬁnancially developed nations engage more in cross-border lending activities as do larger (in
population terms) countries.20 In spite of the neoclassical prediction, capital is directed to-
wards relatively wealthy countries. Martin and Rey (2004) attribute this result to increased
diversiﬁcation opportunities in richer nations, while Gertler and Rogoﬀ (1990) argue that
capital market imperfections are mitigated in aﬄuent countries, since wealth can serve as
collateral.
Columns (2), (3) and (4) add the composite institutional index (ICRG political risk) to
the gravity equation. The coeﬃcient on Instj,t−1 is at least three standard errors above zero.
Further, the model’s ﬁt has substantially increased (the R2 has jumped from 0.45 to above
0.50). In columns (3) and (4) I control for macroeconomic developments both in the "source"
(i) and the "destination" (j) country. Numerous studies (Calvo, Leiderman, Reinhart 1993,
1994; Frankel and Roubini, 2001) have documented a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of global
interest rates on "N o r t ht oS o u t h " capital ﬂows. Consistent with this result, the coeﬃcient
on the lending rate (Ratei,t) in the "source" country is signiﬁcantly negative. This implies
that high interest rate periods are associated with lower levels of bank lending activities not
only to developing but also to industrial countries. In column (4) I add inﬂation (Infj,t)t o
control for economic conditions in j.T h e c o e ﬃcient on inﬂation is negative, but statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant. Although in many of the subsequent speciﬁcations Infj,t enters with a
19Buch, Kleinert, and Toubal (2004) provide a thorough review of both the theoretical foundations and
recent empirical results on the impact of distance on bilateral trade and asset ﬂows. Portes and Rey
(forthcoming) show that when other factors that more directly capture information costs (telephone traﬃc,
foreign newspapers sales) enter an equity ﬂows gravity speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient of distance decreases
substantially (although it is still negative and signiﬁcant). Distance might also be capturing (part of) the
eﬀect of trade on capital ﬂows. Aviat and Coeurdacier (2004) present cross-sectional evidence that distance’s
signiﬁcance in asset trade studies is partly driven by a strong correlation between asset and trade ﬂows. Their
regressions reveal that when bank holdings and trade are simultaneously estimated the eﬀect of distance in
the bank holdings regression shrinks.
20The only standard gravity variable that does not enter positively and signiﬁc a n t l y( a si td o e si nt r a d e
studies) is a common border dummy, which takes on the value one when the two countries are adjacent.
This comes at no surprise though, since we expect adjacency to be much more important in goods trade.
Including the common border dummy yields almost identical coeﬃcients to those presented in Table 3 (and
in all subsequent tables).
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controls, such as GDP growth appear insigniﬁcant.22 Note that the coeﬃcient on the com-
posite institutions index has remained stable and is still signiﬁcantly positive. In columns
(5) and (6) I use the natural logarithm of Instj,t−1 to directly interpret the coeﬃcient as
an elasticity. The speciﬁcation also includes regional and income level dummies to capture
unobserved "recipient" country heterogeneity.23 Not only has the γ coeﬃcient retained its
statistical signiﬁcance, but its magnitude is economically large. Its scale implies that condi-
tional on geography and economic development (captured both by per capita GDP and the
income dummies) a one percent increase (decrease) in institutional eﬃciency is followed by
a rise (decline) of approximately 2 percent in the level of international banking activities.
5.1.2 Alternative Estimators
Table 4 presents estimates based on alternative panel methodologies. Column (1) reports
the "between" estimator. Although this method removes the time series dimension (by
using mean values), it is useful to identify which countries receive on average the bulk of
international bank capital. The estimated coeﬃcient implies an even larger institutional
eﬀect on international bank lending (elasticity u 4). The R2 has also jumped to 0.77.
This ﬁnding extends the recent cross-sectional results of Alfaro et al. (2003), who show
that institutional quality can explain why capital does not move towards poor nations.
My estimates suggest that countries with poorly performing institutions not only receive
substantially less net foreign inﬂows, but also engage much less in cross-border lending and
borrowing activities.
An important policy question is whether foreign investors actually "reward" structural
policies that improve the institutional environment through increased investment. The ﬁxed-
eﬀects "within" estimates directly answer this enquiry. The estimates in column (2) should,
21The results are similar if one substitutes inﬂation with the lending rate in the capital recipient country.
The coeﬃcient on lending rate in j is in most speciﬁcation negative and signiﬁcant. However, its size and
magnitude is very small.
22Frankel and Roubini (2001) describe this peculiar ﬁnding as follows: "....(research) came to a surpris-
ing conclusion: the most important identiﬁable factors behind the ﬂows were US interest rates and other
macroeconomic variables external to the emerging market countries. Capital was heading South because low
rates of return were on oﬀer in the North. This was a surprising conclusion because the more common belief
at the time was that domestic factors within the emerging market countries were responsible, particularly
pro-market policy reforms.." Studies in FDI and portfolio ﬂows have likewise demonstrated that this ﬁnding
applies also to advanced countries.
23The high income and the regional dummies come from World-Bank’s country classiﬁcation.
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as distance and ethnolinguistic ties, while weknow ex ante that these factors are important
determinants of cross-border lending. The coeﬃcient on the composite institutional index
has decayed but is still positive and highly signiﬁcant. The estimated elasticity suggests
that if a country implements structural policies that improve the institutional and politi-
cal environment, bilateral bank ﬂows are expected to increase by approximately 3.6% at a
quarterly basis. Such improvements are not rare in my sample. Argentina, for example,
experienced a substantial decline in political risk after the fall of the military dictatorship
and the end of the Falklands War in 1984 (ICRG political risk jumped from 50 to 55). An
even greater improvement occurred in Indonesia in 1991,r e ﬂecting the radical political power
decentralization (political risk jumped from 44 in the ﬁrst quarter of 1990 to 58 in the ﬁrst
quarter of 1991). Democratizations are also associated with signiﬁcant declines in political
risk: Examples include South Africa after the 1994 elections that ended the "apartheid" or
Chile in 1990 when Augusto Pinochet was removed from power.
Another approach, which fully utilizes the panel information, would be to estimate a
"random-eﬀects" model. This approach introduces country-pair ﬁxed-eﬀects, while allowing
for time invariant regressors. Random-eﬀect estimates are typically more eﬃcient, since they
use information both "between"a n d" within" panels. Their consistency, however, crucially
relies on individual eﬀects not being correlated with the disturbances.24 Random-eﬀect es-
timates are reported in column (3). The statistical and economic signiﬁcance of the RHS
variables has remained stable. The coeﬃcient on the political risk is still positive and signif-
icantly diﬀerent from zero at any conventional level.
Columns (4) and (5) report estimates of a "quasi-ﬁxed eﬀects" model. The speciﬁcation
in column (4) includes a vector of "source" country dummies that control time-invariant
characteristics in the lending countries that are diﬃcult to observe, like diﬀerences in report-
ing, accounting or the exact deﬁnition of ﬁnancial institutions’ cross-border transactions.
Adding "source" country ﬁxed eﬀects also controls for the disproportionately large impact
that certain countries have in the international banking system.25 In column (5) a vector
24Unfortunately, in this case, a Hausman speciﬁcation test is not particularly helpful. Many time-invariant
factors are signiﬁcant and one cannot distinguish whether the observed ﬁxed-eﬀects correlation with the error
term of the within estimator is due to factors omitted in the within estimation (distance, ethnolinguistic
ties, etc.), but included in the random-eﬀects or other truly unobserved factors. Moreover, our sample is
not randomly drawn from a larger population and "random-eﬀect" estimation might not be theoretically
appropriate. For more details see Baltagi (2001) and Wooldridge (2002).
25Wei (2000) provides a more analytical discussion on the merits of the "quasi-ﬁxed-eﬀects"m o d e li n
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cipient countries. The speciﬁcation given in column (6) includes both a vector of "source"
and a vector of "recipient" country ﬁxed-eﬀects. The elasticity of institutions in the double-
ﬁxed eﬀects model is signiﬁcnat at the 95 conﬁdence level and similar in magnitude to the
ﬁxed-eﬀects model (column 2). This suggests that controlling for unobserved time-invariant
characteristics both of the capital recipient and the capital investing country, an institutional
enhancement is associated with a signiﬁcant increase in bilateral banking activities.
An important econometric consideration concerns the structure of the error term. Since
ﬂows are estimated by the BIS as the exchange rate adjusted change in total assets, ﬁrst-
diﬀe r e n c i n gm i g h tl e a dt oa na u t o c o r r e l a t e de r r o rt e r m ,w h i c hw o u l di nt u r nc o r r u p ti n -
ference. Columns (7) and (8) give the Prais-Winsten and random eﬀect GLS estimates,
respectively, that correct for ﬁrst-order residual correlation.26 Although autocorrelated dis-
turbances are not present if we pool all data together, persistence might occur in speciﬁc
country-pairs. Feasible GLS estimates that allow for arbitrary panel-speciﬁc autocorrelation
(and heteroskedasticity) are given in the last column. The point estimates are similar to
OLS, suggesting that autocorrelation is not corrupting inference.
5.2 Speciﬁc Institutional Characteristics
Exactly which institutions or policies are associated with higher levels of ﬁnancial devel-
opment and cross-border lending? I attack this key policy question by investigating which
speciﬁc institutions are of foremost importance in attracting high volumes of foreign capital.
Moreover to distinguish the importance of institutions and politics, I present speciﬁcations
where the political risk rating and the speciﬁc institutional measures are jointly estimated.27
gravity models of asset trade.
26A formal test of autocorrelation (Wooldridge, 2002) rejects the presence of serially correlated disturbances
at any standard conﬁdence level.
27The speciﬁc institutional indicators are purely cross-sectional. Institutional persistence, however, sug-
gests that this is not a serious drawback. One could argue that estimation and inference in a panel context is,
however, problematic. A solution is to estimate cross-section regressions either on mean values or at speciﬁc
years. Such estimates yield an even larger impact of institutional performance on international banking
activities. These results are available upon request.
Another problem arises, because ideally in the speciﬁcations that include both the composite institutions-
politics ICRG rating and speciﬁc institutional measures (like corruption or legal system quality) one would
want to exclude from the composite measure the part that the speciﬁc index measures. Due to data unavail-
ability on the speciﬁc sub-components of the political risk rating at the quarterly basis, however, this is not
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"source" or "recipient" country ﬁxed-eﬀects or both. The coeﬃcient’s statistical signiﬁcance
and magnitude is not particularly sensitive to the exact speciﬁcation.28
5.2.1 Corruption
Theory on FDI has stressed the malignant role of corruption (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994)
and transparency (Mody, Razin, and Sadka, 2003) in attracting foreign capital. While there
is some empirical evidence supportive to these models linking corruption to FDI (e.g. Wei,
2000), its impact on other types of capital ﬂows has not been examined.
In Table 5 I augment the baseline gravity model with the TI corruption index (lower
numbers in the index correspond to higher corruption). The coeﬃcient estimates show a
strong and robust negative eﬀect of corruption on international banking activities. The
point estimate in column (1) implies that if Peru, which scores 4.7 (in a 0−10 scale), tackles
c o r r u p t i o nu pt ot h el e v e lo fC o s t aR i c a( 8.3), then bilateral bank ﬂow transactions will
increase by almost 1.5% [(8.33 − 4.70) ∗ 0.4144 = 1.504] at a quarterly basis. Corruption
retains both its statistical and economic signiﬁcance, even when the "political" or "economic"
risk measures are included in the speciﬁcation (columns (2) and (3) respectively).29
This result contradicts Wei and Wu (2001), who document either an insigniﬁcant or even
positive eﬀect of corruption on international bank lending activities. The present study,
however, diﬀers in many dimensions from the Wei and Wu (2001) study: First, their results
are based on cross-sectional regressions, with data averaged for the 1994−1996 period, while
the present study utilizes data for 18 years. Second, their sample covers substantially fewer
lending countries (i). Third they study inter-bank loans using another BIS dataset, while
the Locational Banking Statistics, I exploit, include also equity and FDI ﬂows. Fourth, and
most importantly, their analysis concentrates on how corruption aﬀects the composition of
capital ﬂows, not how it impacts bilateral bank lending. My results are, however, in line
with their model on corruption’s eﬀect on capital ﬂows.30
28Results based on other panel-techniques (like those employed in Section 5.1.2)f o rt h ee ﬀect of speciﬁc
institutional characteristics and not reported are available upon request.
29The "economic risk" rating is a weighted sum of the following macroeconomic factors: GDP growth,
inﬂation, ﬁscal balance, current account and GDP per capita. For more details see Appendix B.
30Wei and Wu (2001) also acknowledge that it is peculiar that foreign banks seem to lend more to banks
in corrupt countries. The results presented in this study suggest that not only this eﬀect is not robust,
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To proxy for the quality of the laws in place I introduce the antidirector’s rights index into
the gravity model (Anti_directj). The estimated coeﬃcient reported in columns (4)-(7) is,
however, small and in most speciﬁcations insigniﬁcant. This accords with Portes and Rey
who ﬁnd this crude measure of investor protection to have no systematic impact on gross
equity ﬂows.
International investors do not care so much about how well laws, acts and commercial
codes are designed. Rather, they focus on rights actual protection and enforcement. Likewise,
theory concentrates on how fast and to what extent legal rights are safeguarded by the judicial
system (Djankov et al., 2003). As a proxy for the de facto eﬃcacy of the legal system, I use a
measure of contract enforceability, which is based on legal system’s formality and speed. This
variable (Contractj)a l w a y se n t e r st h es p e c i ﬁcation with a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient.
Even conditioning on the overall institutional quality and political stability (in column (5)),
Contractj h a sal a r g ee c o n o m i ce ﬀect: the point estimate suggests that if Portugal, (which
has the lowest level of legal protection in the European Union, scoring 4.54), modernizes its
judicial system to Belgium’s level (which scores 8.40), the volume of cross-border banking
activities will increase by more than 1% on a quarterly basis [(8.40−4.54)∗0.298 = 1.15]. In
the last column I employ the time it takes to evict a tenant for nonpayment (Legal_timej)a s
an alternative measure of legal eﬃciency. The estimated coeﬃcient implies that if the judicial
process in Chile, where it takes approximately 240 days to evict a tenant for nonpayment,
becomes as fast as in Brazil, where it takes 120 days, the volume of cross-border banking
activities is expected to increase by almost 14% ([(240 − 120)/240] ∗ 0.275 ' 0.1375).31
Jointly, the coeﬃcient estimates suggest that modifying and upgrading anachronistic
laws is a necessary yet not suﬃcient condition to attract foreign (bank) capital. A fast-
proceeding judicial process and high quality law enforcement are far more important. Finally,
legal system quality indicators retain their signiﬁcance, even conditioning on corruption and
overall economic environment (column (7)), hinting that these two institutional structures
play an independent role.
31In the previous version of the paper, I also employed other legal quality measures. Speciﬁcally: i) a 0 to
7 legal formalism index, ii) the time it takes to collect a bounced check, and iii) t h et i m ei tt a k e st os t a r tu p
a new business. Djankov et al. (2002, 2003) show that these variables are good proxies for the operational
performance of the legal system and bureaucratic quality. All these variables are strongly correlated with
each other and the results are quantitatively very alike. These results are available upon request.
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A somewhat neglected characteristic of ﬁnancial systems is state control of the banking sys-
tem. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) document that not only is government
ownership of banks pervasive around the globe, but it is also associated with low levels
of ﬁnancial development and weak growth rates. They distinguish between "development"
theories that stress the beneﬁcial aspects of government ownership and the "public-choice"
tradition that emphasizes the negative consequences of state’s active involvement in the
credit market. In her study on the lending practices of Italian banks, Sapienza (2004) of-
fers an intuitive explanation for the pro public-choice evidence given by La Porta et al.
(2002): Italian state owned banks charge substantially lower interest rates than privately-
run banks and lend substantially more in areas where the government has a large clientele.
Government ownership, however, need not have a negative eﬀect for foreign investors. It can
actually minimize credit risk, since governments often safeguard their banks’ debt. If this
"development" prediction holds, then one would expect, other things being equal, higher
international lending to countries with high levels of state ownership of the banking sector.
To quantify the eﬀect of government control, I augment the baseline speciﬁcation with a
variable representing the share of the top 10 banks in a given country owned by the govern-
ment of that country (Gov_Ownj). This cross-sectional variable is taken from La Porta et
al. (2002) and corresponds approximately to the middle of the panel (approx. around 1995).
Figure 4 plots the mean of the logarithm of cross-border bank ﬂows against Gov_Ownj and
the clear negative association rejects the "development" conjecture. The regression results
in Table 6 are not only in line, but also advance the recent pro-"public-choice" ﬁndings of
La Porta et al. (2002) and Sapienza (2004): Foreign banks realize that state-controlled ﬁ-
nancial institutions promote political rather than proﬁt maximizing objectives; consequently
government ownership of banks heavily impedes international lending. This suggests that
the agency costs associated with state control by far surpass the beneﬁts gained from implicit
or explicit guarantees. The point estimates imply that controlling for the macroeconomic
environment (with the composite economic risk rating in column (3)), increasing the govern-
ment’s share in the banking system by one percent decreases the level of cross-border bank
lending by more than 1.6%.
Previous studies have shown that state ownership is strongly correlated with a poorly
performing banking system. To isolate the eﬀect of state ownership, I directly control for
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(Bank_Soundj)a n da ne s t i m a t eo fb a n k s ’o v e r h e a dc o s t s( Overheadj). Moreover, to assess
how the banking system’s structure aﬀects inter-bank activities, in columns (4)—(6) I use
inter-bank (instead of aggregate) ﬂows as the dependent variable. The health and operational
performance of the banking system in the recipient country is a crucial factor driving gross
inter-bank international capital ﬂows. As indicated by the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on both
Bank_Soundj and Overheadj international banks invest substantially less in countries with
low bank ratings and high operating costs. After controlling for the institutional environment
and the health of the banking system, state ownership is still associated with substantially
lower levels of international inter-bank lending.
These results oﬀer an intuitive explanation for ﬁnancial intermediaries’ illiquidity in rel-
atively poor countries: government control of the banking system discourages both domestic
capital accumulation and foreign lending. Numerous studies point out that a banking sys-
tem’s liquidity has a causal eﬀect on economic growth. The evidence, therefore, suggests
that privatizing and liberalizing the banking system will drive foreign bank capital and relax
banking system liquidity constraints, fostering in turn growth and investment.
6 Further Evidence
6.1 Developed vs. Developing Countries - EU membership
A major concern regarding most empirical analyses on institutions is whether the estimated
eﬀect is driven by the substantial variability between rich and developing (or underdeveloped)
countries. Institutions are strongly correlated with other, diﬃcult to observe, economic
(or ﬁnancial) factors that distinguish industrial from underdeveloped countries. Although
the "ﬁxed" and "quasi-ﬁxed" eﬀect estimates address this point, I reestimated the basic
econometric model distinguishing between high and medium income countries. This also
enables me to assess the eﬀect of the ongoing European integration in cross-border banking
activities.
Columns (1)—(4) in Table 7 give estimates for the eﬀect of institutional performance in
high income countries (as classiﬁe db yt h eW o r l dB a n k )o n l y . 32 The model has retained its
32In the previous version of the paper, I distinguished between developed and developing countries using
OECD membership. The results are almost identical if one uses current OECD member countries, or the
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capita GDP, land area, and population) enter with robust coeﬃcients. The coeﬃcients on
the political risk rating and the more speciﬁc institutional indicators appear not particularly
sensitive and highly signiﬁcant. The most conservative estimate (column (4)) for the political
risk coeﬃcient, for example, implies that a one percent institutional improvement is followed
by an almost two percentage increase in the volume of international bank ﬂow.
Columns (2) to (4) include two dummies for European Union (EU) membership: the
ﬁrst takes a value of one when one of the two counterparts is an EU member (EU_one);
the second equals one when both countries are EU members (EU_both).33 The EU Sin-
gle Market and the subsequent Financial Service Action Plan aimed to remove both direct
and indirect barriers in cross-border movements of capital by harmonizing banking law and
ﬁnancial services’ regulation. Moreover, the single currency has eliminated exchange rate
risk. The results suggest that EU membership has led to a substantial expansion of bank-
ing activities across member countries. Although the coeﬃcient on the EU_one dummy
is statistically indistinguishable from zero, joint EU membership has a large eﬀect. The
estimates imply that cross border bank ﬂows between member states by approximately 30%
(exp(0.27) − 1=0 .31).34 This result suggests that substantial integration has taken place
not only in equity and debt markets, but in the banking sector as well.35 Banking integra-
tion has taken the form of increased cross-border lending and borrowing rather than through
mergers and acquisitions, as in the United States. This result, I believe, has direct policy
implications, since recent studies show that the U.S. banking sector integration has not only
been associated with substantial growth gains (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996), but also led
to business cycle synchronization across states (Morgan, Rime, and Strahan, 2004).
6.2 Political, Economic and Financial Risk
Table 2 shows a strong correlation between the "political risk" measure and the other two
ICRG risk ratings: the "economic" and "ﬁnancial" risk indicators. One could suspect that
pre-1995 OECD members or the G-7 or the G-10 countries.
33See for a similar approach Glick and Rose (2002) and Rose (2004), who quantify the impact of trade
agreements on the volume of bilateral trade ﬂows.
34Inserting EU member dummies in the full sample of countries yields larger coeﬃcients. I report the
most conservative estimates, since I want to avoid EU membership capturing an OECD or a "high income"
countries eﬀect.
35Recent reports on European ﬁnancial integration (e.g. Baele et al., 2004) document considerable conver-
gence in bond and equity markets. Yet these studies suggest that the banking sector has been left behind.
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rather than institutional and/or political conditions. To identify which risk is of most im-
portance for foreign banks when making their international capital allocation decisions, in
Table 8 I estimate gravity models augmented with each of the three risk ratings.
Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1996a,b), for example, ﬁnd the "economic" risk to be the
key factor with "political" risk being the least informative in predicting future equity and
bond returns.36 My results reveal a diﬀerent picture. Although all risk characteristics are
signiﬁcant drivers of foreign (bank) capital, "political risk" is the most important of the
three. Not only is the "political risk" coeﬃcient the largest in magnitude, but the spec-
iﬁcation with this index has the best explanatory power (in terms of R2). This result is
strengthened in columns (4)—(6), where I focus on inter-bank ﬂows and add a full set of
"recipient" country dummies to check whether, controlling for idiosyncratic country factors,
foreign banks primarily examine political/institutional, economic or ﬁnancial developments.
Although "political risk" eﬀect has decayed, it is the only component of risk rating entering
with a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient (see for a similar ﬁnding, Gelos and Wei, 2002).37
Economic enters all speciﬁcations with a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient. Although this
might seem logical, in a mean-variance model framework this eﬀect is not straightforward.
High risk is associated with increased volatility both also with higher expected returns. So
i td e p e n d so nt h em o d e l ’ sp a r a m e t e r sw h i c he ﬀect dominates. The results indicate that
the negative channel of high volatility dominates the positive impact of higher expected
returns.38
6.3 Liability Flows
In Table 9 the basic speciﬁcation is re-estimated with the logarithm of liability ﬂows from i
to j as the dependent variable. Interestingly the model performs well for liability ﬂows. The
36Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1996a) give also detailed correlations and a lucid analysis of the diﬀerent
available indicators of country risk.
37I also estimated speciﬁcations including the economic and the political risk (and also ﬁnancial risk)
simultaneously. Although multicollinearity seriously plagues thesee s t i m a t e s ,t h ec o e ﬃcient on the political
risk indicator in j is always positive and has the largest of the three risk ratings magnitude.
38When I restrict estimation in the European Union subsample (before the 2004 Enlargement), the coeﬃ-
cient on economic risk becomes negative and signiﬁcnat [when the model in column (2) is estimated only on
intra-EU ﬂows the estimated elasticity of economic risk is −2.204 (t − stat. =3 .15).] This implies that con-
ditioning on EU membership, international banks invested more in the relatively riskier countries to realize
beneﬁts arising from higher expected returns (for example foreign institutional investors heavily invested in
government securities and equities in the countries of the South just before the adoption of the Euro).
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countries (columns (5) and (6)) are important drivers not only of international investment,
but also borrowing ﬂows. This results is robust to the inclusion of "source" or/and "recipient"
country ﬁxed eﬀects. Since international borrowing is less risky than investing, such that low-
quality institutions need not necessarily be such an important factor for the borrower, this
result is puzzling. It can be rationalized, however, as follows: First, due to the hub structure
of the international banking system, ﬁnancially developed countries (mainly Germany, the
United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom) are simultaneously both the big lenders
and borrowers. Second, foreign liabilities of country i, held by residents in j, can serve as
collateral for country j borrowing, thus increasing bilateral lending by reducing the riskiness
of foreign investment. This ﬁnding extends previous results of Moshirian and Van der Laan
(1998) and Buch (2000), who examined the international lending behavior of US, UK and
German banks. It is also consistent with Ruﬃn and Rassek (1986), who model and show the
complementary nature of the investment and ﬁnancing decisions of large US multinational
corporations. My results, which cover a much wider sample of countries and years, suggest
that foreign assets and liabilities are mutually dependent. Institutional performance and
political developments can therefore explain both international lending and borrowing.
7 Sensitivity Analysis
The evidence reveals a strong link between political institutions and gross bank ﬂows. Po-
litical risk, along with legal eﬃciency, corruption, government ownership of banks and EU
membership in particular, crucially inﬂuence the volume of international capital (bank)
movements. In this section I provide some robustness checks, checking: i) potential omitted
variables bias, ii) the BIS data quality, iii) endogeneity and measurement error and iv)t h e
stability of the model in various samples.
7.1 Additional Controls
Low levels of human capital reduce the return of foreign capital. Since human capital is
highly correlated both with wealth and well-functioning institutions, the previous estimates
might be capturing part of education’s eﬀect. In addition, Alsan et al. (2004) have recently
shown that health is an important determinant of FDI. They argue that life expectancy
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panel speciﬁcations adding secondary schooling and/or (the log of) life expectancy. The
coeﬃcients for schooling and/or life expectancy are both positive and highly signiﬁcant.
Consistent with a neoclassical production function, more educated societies, other things
equal, engage more in international banking activities and have consequently more liquid
ﬁnancial intermediaries. Most importantly, neither the eﬀect of the aggregate institutions-
political risk index nor that of all other speciﬁci n s t i t u t i o n a lm e a s u r e sh a sl o s te c o n o m i ca n d
statistical signiﬁcance. The estimates thus suggest that wealth (proxied by the log of GDP),
human capital (proxied by schooling and/or life expectancy), and politics (captured by
the ICRG "political risk" indicator) and institutions (measured by the speciﬁc institutional
variables) all contribute explaining the low volume of international capital ﬂows in poor
countries.
The exchange rate regime can also play an important role for foreign investors. Many
countries have adopted ﬁxed exchange rate regimes to signal their commitment to sound
monetary policy and attract foreign capital. In the last three columns I exploit the recent
Rogoﬀ and Reinhart (2004) exchange rate regime classiﬁcation and add measures of the
exchange rate regime’s rigidity. The "ﬁne" classiﬁcation (ER_regime1j,t) ranges from 1
to 15, while the "coarse" classiﬁcation (ER_regime2j,t)f r o m0 to 6.F o r b o t h m e a s u r e s
higher levels suggest more liberal exchange rate polices.39 The estimated coeﬃcients are
both at least two standard errors below zero, implying that foreign banks prefer investing
in countries with ﬁxed exchange rate regimes. The estimates retain their signiﬁcance even
in the "within"s p e c i ﬁcation (column (6)), suggesting that if a country moves towards a less
ﬂexible exchange rate arrangement it will receive more foreign bank capital. Even though
ﬁxed exchange rate regimes are associated with sharp devaluations, it seems that foreign
banks prefer bearing this risk rather than that arising from non credible monetary policy
and high exchange rate volatility (see Gelos and Wei, fortcoming for a simial result).
7.2 Data Limitations
Not all countries receive foreign bank credit in all quarters. Speciﬁcally, the BIS dataset in-
cludes many zeros, especially in transactions towards emerging and non-developed countries.
39As c o r eo f1 (e.g. the Euro member countries), for example, implies a super-ﬁx, a 2 (e.g. Argentina in
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til now. Careful data examination reveals that these zeros represent non reporting gaps
rather than actual zero ﬂows. Still, I re-estimated all previous speciﬁcations replacing zeros
with a value of one, yielding a log value of zero. Table 10 reproduces estimates after this
transformation. Column (1) reports OLS estimates. Since the data has now many zero
observations, columns (2)—(5) give Tobit estimates. Due to the excess zero observations, the
overall model ﬁt has worsened. The sign and statistical signiﬁcance of all coeﬃcients has,
however, remained unchanged. Corruption is still negatively associated with capital inﬂows,
as is state ownership of the banking system. Likewise, a high quality, eﬃcient and fast legal
system is particularly attractive to foreign banks.
7.3 Endogeneity and Measurement Error
Institutional quality indicators are plagued by measurement error. This problem is particu-
larly severe in the political risk rating, since it is impossible to summarize in a single variable
all dimensions of the institutional and political environment. Classical measurement error,
however, yields an attenuation bias, suggesting that results so far have been conservative.
A more important concern is, thus, reverse causality, which, if present, will produce over-
estimated coeﬃcients. An increased volume of foreign capital may itself lead to institutional
improvement. Domestic ﬁrms may, for example, adopt stricter accounting standards and
apply more transparent corporate governance practices. The government may remove capital
account restrictions and privatize state enterprises. Even if no reverse causality is present,
over-stated coeﬃcients can arise if the researchers at PRS assign higher ratings to countries
that receive more inward investment.
These problems, however, can be addressed with suitable instruments. Following recent
studies on the determinants of institutions, I instrument the political risk index with latitude
and measures of linguistic, ethnical and religious fragmentation (column (5)).40 The ﬁrst
40Hall and Jones (1999) showed that geography, latitude in particularly, is strongly correlated with high
quality institutions. Alesina et al. (2003) document that the ethnolinguistic composition of the society is
strongly correlated with institutional and economic performance. I also experienced with the Acemoglu et
al. (2001) settler mortality rate as an instrument of institutional quality. The results are robust and not
driven by the exact instrument set. Adding in the instruments set in column (5) speciﬁcation the log of
settler mortality yields an even larger coeﬃcient on political risk of 3.34 (with a t−ratio of 2.88). I decided
not to report IV estimates with the settler mortality measure, since my sample consists mainly of developed
countries, where this variable is unavailable.
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over-identifying restrictions does not cast doubt on the instruments validity (p-value 0.184).
The coeﬃcient not only has retained both its statistical and economic signiﬁcance. The point
estimates imply that a one percent improvement in the political risk dimension is associated
with approximately 2.5% rise in cross-border banking activities.
Due to its secrecy and illegality, corruption is likewise diﬃcult to compute. The TI
measure I use is a blend of various perception-based measures. Although this minimizes
systematic bias, it introduces noise, which attenuates the coeﬃcient.42 Thus, in column (6)
I follow Mauro (1995) and instrument corruption with measures of fractionalization. The
instrumented corruption measure enters the gravity model with a statistically signiﬁcant and
relatively stable coeﬃcient.
In the last column, I instrument the two legal quality measures. Following La Porta et
al. (1998), who argued that legal origin has aﬀected the evolution and quality of the legal
system, I use legal origin dummies. The coeﬃcient on the de facto legal quality measure is
statistically signiﬁcant and robust suggesting that our previous estimates were neither driven
by reverse causality nor by systematic measurement error.43
7.4 Sample
Table 12 provides additional robustness checks. I perturb the model in various ways to check
the results’ stability in diﬀerent samples. Each panel reports three gravity speciﬁcations: (i)
with the political risk rating (INSTj,t−1)o n l y ,( ii) with the speciﬁc institutional measures
only, and (iii) with both the time-varying political risk rating and the speciﬁc cross-country
institutional indicators. In Panel A, I have excluded bank ﬂows from the United States to
check whether the results are driven by the fundamental role of the U.S. in the international
41See Staiger and Stock (1997). The ﬁrst stage overall R2 is 0.385 and the t-statistics of the exogenous
instruments all greater than 10.
42The corruption measure can not capture whether the bribery can guarantee that the business is going
to proceed or not. Moreover, it does not tell us anything about the "industrial organization" of corruption
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994. Whether, for example, there are various governmental agencies competing for
bribes (as in Russia) or there is a domestic corruption monopolist ). For a more detailed discussion of the
various corruption indicators and the conceptual issues surrounding corruption see Wei (2000).
43A possibility of course that can not been ruled out is that the upward bias arising from reverse causality
exactly cancels the attenuation eﬀect. A concern with the IV estimates is that the instruments are purely
cross-sectional, while the second stage regression has time dimension as well. I thus estimated the second
stage on averaged data. The estimated coeﬃcients imply an even larger impact of political risk, corruption,
and contract enforceability on cross-border bank ﬂows.
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involving U.S., Japan or Germany (G3). In Panel C, I ignore all intra-G7 transactions. In
Panels D and E I vary the sample period. Instead of using data from all available years, I
split the sample into two equally-spaced parts before and after the early nineties. This twist
is interesting since many economies have only recently lifted capital account restrictions. In
addition the volume of cross-border capital ﬂows has drastically increased in the late nineties.
In Panel F, I exclude from the speciﬁc a t i o nt h et i m en u i s a n c ep a r a m e t e r s( at).
The coeﬃcients on both the political risk-composite institutional rating and the speciﬁc
institutional variables are not particularly sensitive neither to the sample nor the exact spec-
iﬁcation. "Political risk", for example, enters with a coeﬃcient which is in all versions close
to 0.05 and at least two standard deviations above zero. When the "political risk" enters
jointly with the speciﬁc institutional variables, its coeﬃcient decays, but retains both its sta-
tistical and economic signiﬁcance. Of the four speciﬁc institutional variables (Corruptionj,
Contractj, Anti_directj, Gov_Ownj), government ownership of banks and contract en-
forceability appear to be the most important. Both have coeﬃcients that are statistically
diﬀerent than zero in all permutations. Moreover the range of the estimated coeﬃcients for
Contractj and Gov_Ownj is relatively narrow implying that a poorly performing and mis-
functioning legal system as well as a state-owned banking system strongly impede foreign
capital. Corruption and low de jure investor’s protection also inﬂuence foreign banks, but
to lesser extent.
8C o n c l u s i o n
Few doubt that institutions to a smaller or greater extent inﬂuence ﬁnancial and economic
development. The challenge for empirical research is to quantify which type and through
which channels institutions impact economic activity. This paper studies the determinants of
gross international bank ﬂows in a large panel of countries and years. Besides identifying the
driving forces of international banking, this paper provides the ﬁrst comprehensive analysis
of the role of politics and institutions on cross-border capital movements.
The results are straightforward. First, conditioning on "gravity" factors ("size" and
distance), countries with high-quality institutions and low political risk engage more in asset
trade. Second, foreign banks prefer to allocate credit to uncorrupted countries with well-
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associated with lower levels of international bank lending. Third, ﬁnancial securities’ and
banking law harmonization policies that European countries have implemented together with
minimizing of exchange rate risk, have spurred cross-border bank lending activities within
the European Union. The results also reveal that foreign banks are especially concerned
with political, rather than other risk factors.
These results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks including: Controlling for omit-
ted variables; addressing problems of the BIS dataset; dealing with measurement error and
the potential endogeneity of the institutional ratings; checking the empirical model’s stabil-
ity to diﬀerent country samples and time-horizons, and more. Most importantly, the panel
regressions yield signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on both the political risk rating and the speciﬁci n -
stitutional indicators, even when these variables are jointly entered in the speciﬁcation. The
results also hold when one controls for "economic" or "ﬁnancial" risk. The panel evidence
thus suggest that political stability, actual (de facto) legal system quality and state involve-
ment in the banking sector are not only key determinants in the investment strategy of
international banks, but play somewhat independent roles.
The dataset on bilateral banking activities covers a sizable amount of the overall volume
of gross international capital movements, and includes not only inter-bank loans, but also
signiﬁcant amounts of portfolio and direct investment ﬂows. Consequently the empirical
results have a more general interpretation.
First from a theoretical standpoint the evidence supports Shleifer and Wolfenzon’s (2002)
model, that stresses the importance of an eﬃcient legal system for ﬁnancial development.
The results also oﬀer a plausible explanation to the Lucas (1990) famous inquiry on "why
capital doesn’t ﬂow from rich to poor nations" and the associated "home-bias puzzle". Part of
the answer is in poor nations’ political instability, corruption, ineﬃcient government policies
and low-quality law.
Second, from a policy perspective the evidence implies that improving ineﬃcient bureau-
cracies, tackling corruption, and enhancing legal system competence are crucial for attract-
ing foreign bank capital. The "ﬁxed-eﬀect" estimates that control for time-invariant omitted
variables and exploit the "within" country variation also suggest that political liberaliza-
tions, privatization and other structural policies (which are followed by a decline in political
risk), can enhance domestic liquidity by attracting substantially more foreign capital. This
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applies to both developing and industrialized countries.Third, the results call for additional research. New empirical work has to assess how
politics and institutions aﬀect other types of capital ﬂows. Theory on international capital
movements needs to model explicitly the mechanisms through which institutions inﬂuence
investors’ decisions. Although it is unlikely that institutions alone can explain the large
equity home-bias and the low levels of international diversiﬁcation, institutional performance
and politics should be a necessary ingredient for any serious theoretical and empirical eﬀort
to analyze cross-border capital movements.
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Source-Reporting countries (19):
Austria (AUT)h,eu,B e l g i u m( B E L ) h,eu,D e n m a r k( D N K ) h,eu, Finland (FIN)h,eu,F r a n c e
(FRA)h,eu,G e r m a n y( D E U ) h,eu,I r e l a n d( I R L ) h,eu, Italy (ITA)h,eu, Netherlands (NLD)h,eu,
Norway (NOR)h, Portugal (start 1997 q4) (PRT)h,eu, Spain (ESP)h,eu,S w e d e n( S W E ) h,eu,
Switzerland (CHE)h, United Kingdom (GBR)h,eu, United States (USA)h, Japan (JPN)h,
Canada (CAN)h, Australia (AUS)h.
Recipient (vis-a-vis) countries (51):
Argentina (ARG), Australia (AUS)h, Austria (AUT)h,eu,B e l g i u m( B E L ) h,eu,B u l g a r i a
(BGR), Brazil (BRA), Botswana (BWA), Canada (CAN)h, Switzerland (CHE)h, Chile (CHL),
China (CHN), Colombia (COL), Costa Rica (CRI), Czech Republic (CZE), Germany (DEU)h,eu,
Denmark (DNK)h,eu, Ecuador (ECU), Spain (ESP)h,eu, Estonia (EST), Finland (FIN)h,eu,
France (FRA)h,eu, United Kingdom (GBR)h,eu, Croatia (HRV), Hungary (HUN), Indonesia
(IDN), Ireland (IRL)h,eu,I s r a e l( I S R ) ,I t a l y( I T A ) h,eu, Jordan (JOR), Japan (JPN)h,K o -
rea, Republic of (KOR), Lithuania (LTU), Latvia (LVA), Mexico (MEX), Malaysia (MYS),
Namibia (NAM), Netherlands (NLD)h,eu,N o r w a y( N O R ) h, New Zealand (NZL)h,P e r u
(PER), Philippines (PHL), Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT)h,eu, Romania (ROM), Slovak Re-
public (SVK)h, Slovenia (SVN), Sweden (SWE)h,eu, Tunisia (TUN), Turkey (TUR), United
States (USA)h, South Africa (ZAF).
Note: h indicates "High-Income" countries (as classiﬁed by the World Bank); eu indi-
cates European Union 15 member (before the 2004 Enlargement).
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Panel A: Bank ﬂows data
Bank ﬂow data are retrieved form the Bank of International Settlement’s (BIS) Locational
Banking Statistics. The Locational Banking Statistics in the oldest BIS data-source and it
now covers data from banks located in 36 "reporting area" jurisdictions.
However, 17 "source" countries were excluded from the present study due to limited
data availability. Speciﬁcally the following countries were excluded (year of ﬁrst available
observation in parenthesis): India (start 2001), Guernsey (start 2001), Isle of Man (start
2001), Taiwan (start 2000), Chile (start 2002), Bermuda (start 2002), Brazil (start 2002),
Turkey (start 2000), Jersey (start 2001), Panama (start 2002) were excluded because these
countries monetary authorities started reporting bank’s assets and liabilities in the BIS
after 2000. Singapore was excluded because the reported data is not comparable with the
other statistics. The oﬀ-shore centers, namely the Bahamas, Bahrain, Cayman Islands, the
Netherlands Antilles, Hong Kong and Luxembourg were excluded due to data unavailability
for GDP and other macroeconomic variables at a quarterly basis (from IMF’s International
Financial Statistics). Moreover data from oﬀ-shores have many gaps and for some countries
are not reported at a quarterly basis. For most "reporting area" countries data cover more
than 90% of the international assets and liabilities of all banking institutions operating within
their jurisdictions.
Assets and liabilities represent exposure both to non-residents in "vis-a-vis" countries
as well as exposure to domestic residents in foreign country. Assets include almost all on
balance-sheet items (plus some oﬀ-balance sheet items in the area of trustee business). As-
sets include mainly deposits and balances placed with non-resident banks, including bank’s
own related oﬃces, and loans and advances to banks and non-banks. They also include
holdings of securities and participations (i.e. permanent holdings of ﬁnancial interest in
other undertakings) in non-resident entities. Data also include trade-related credit, arrears
of interest and principal that have not been written down and holdings of bank’s own issues
of international securities. They also "cover portfolio and direct investment ﬂows of ﬁnancial
interest in enterprises" (BIS, 2003a).
Banks contributing to the BIS statistical database report only stocks. The BIS estimates
ﬂows by the change of stocks, adjusted by exchange rate changes (which is feasible, since
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ferences in valuation. This adjustment is clearly not perfect, since ﬂows might have occurred
at diﬀerent exchange rates (see Wooldridge, 2002). However this is a typical problem of most
capital ﬂows data and is by far preferable to a manual adjustment (e.g. Van Rijckeghem and
Weder, 2003).
[Source: Locational Banking Statistics, Bank of International Settlements; Fall 2003
(includes both public and not-yet publicly available data)].
• Aggregate asset bank ﬂows: Change of international ﬁnancial claims of bank oﬃces
resident in the “reporting area” ("source" country) to all sectors in "vis-a-vis" countries
("recipient" country).
• Inter-bank capital ﬂows: Change of international ﬁnancial claims of bank oﬃces
resident in the “reporting area” only to banking institutions in vis-a-vis" countries
("recipient" country).
• Aggregate liability bank ﬂows: Change of international ﬁnancial liabilities of bank
oﬃces resident in the “reporting area” only to banking institutions in vis-a-vis" coun-
tries ("recipient" country).
Panel B: Risk characteristics data
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rating comprises 22 variables in three
subcategories of risk: political, ﬁnancial, and economic. It is produced by Political Risk
Services (PRS) on a monthly basis from 1983. The ICRG staﬀ collects political information
and ﬁnancial and economic data, converting these into risk points for each individual risk
component on the basis of a consistent pattern of evaluation. The political risk assessments
are made on the basis of subjective analysis of the available information, while the ﬁnancial
and economic risk assessments are made solely on the basis of objective data. After a risk
assessment (rating) has been awarded to each of the 22 risk components, the components
within each category of risk are added together to provide a risk rating for each risk category
(Political, Financial, or Economic).
• Political Risk: The Political Risk index is based on 100 points, ranging from 0 denot-
ing minimum level of institutional quality to 100 indicating a total absence of political
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of assessing the political stability of the countries covered by ICRG on a comparable
basis." The Political Risk Rating includes 12 variables covering both political and so-
cial attributes (components and weights). (1) : Government Stability, which includes
government Unity, legislative strength, an popular support (16%). (2) : Socioeconomic
Conditions, which include unemployment, consumer conﬁdence, and poverty (16%).
(3) : Investment Proﬁle, which includes assessment in contract viability/expropriation,
proﬁts repatriation, and payment delays (16%). (4) : Internal Conﬂict, which includes
civil war, terrorism/political violence, and civil disorder (16%). (5) : External Conﬂict,
which includes war, cross-border conﬂict, and foreign pressures (16%). (6) : Corrup-
tion (8%). (7) : Military in Politics (8%). (8) : Religion in politics (8%). (9) : Law
and Order (8%). (10) : Ethnic Tensions (8%). (11) : Democratic Accountability (8%).
(12) : Bureaucracy Quality (4%).
• Economic Risk: T h eE c o n o m i cR i s ki n d e xi sb a s e do n50 points, ranging from 0
denoting the highest possible risk level to 50 indicating an elimination of economic
risk. The variable is rescaled to a 0 − 100 range. Its purpose according is ".... to
provide a means of assessing a country’s current economic strengths and weaknesses."
(PRS) The Economic Risk Rating includes 5 weighted variables covering macroeco-
nomic developments. (components and weights): (1) : GDP per Head of Population
(10%). (2) : Real Annual GDP Growth (20%). (3) : Annual Inﬂation Rate (20%).
(4) : Budget Balance as a Percentage of GDP (20%). (5) : Current Account Balance
as a Percentage of GDP (30%)
• Financial Risk: The Financial Risk ranges from 0 denoting the highest possible risk
level to 50 indicating an elimination of ﬁnancial risk. For comparability, the variable
is rescaled to a 0 − 100 r a n g e . A st h eP R Sw r i t e" ..The overall aim of the Finan-
cial Risk Rating is to provide a means of assessing a country’s ability to pay its way.
In essence this requires a system of measuring a country’s ability to ﬁnance its oﬃ-
cial, commercial, and trade debt obligations." The Financial Risk Rating includes 5
weighted variables covering ﬁnancial and monetary sector developments (components
and weights). (1) :Foreign Debt as a Percentage of GDP (20%). (2) : Foreign Debt
Service as a Percentage of Exports of Goods and Services (20%). (3) : Current Account
as a Percentage of Exports of Goods and Services (30%). (4) : Net Liquidity as Months
of Import Cover (10%). (5) : Exchange Rate Stability (20%).
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• Ratej,t− Lending rate: Lending rate is the bank rate that usually meets the short
and medium term ﬁnancing needs of the private sector. [Source: IMF IFS line 60P]
• Infj,t− Inﬂation Rate: Calculated as the change in CPI. [Source: IMF IFS line 64]
• ln(Y )− Log real GDP per capita: Logarithm of GDP per capita volume, converted
to US dollars and adjusted with local CPI.[Source: IMF IFS 99B]
• ln(Area)− Log Area: Natural logarithm of land area in square kilometers.[Source:
Rose(2002) originally from Gallup, Mellinger and Sachs]
• Pop− Population: Values correspond to mid-year estimates. A linear interpolation
is used to ﬁll in missing observations. At the regressions the variable is entered as the
natural logarithm of the interpolated series [Source: IMF IFS line 99Z].
• Tiei,j− Ethnolinguistic Tie: Dummy variable that equals one if the two countries
share a common language or have former colonial relation.[Source: Glick and Rose
(2002), originally from CIA Factbook]
• ln(Disti,j)− Distance: Natural logarithm of greater circle distance between economic
centres (usual, but not always capital cities) in a pair of countries.[Source: Andrew
Rose (2004)]
• Anti_directj− Anti-director rights index: An index aggregating shareholder rights.
The index is formed by adding 1 when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail
their proxy vote to the ﬁrm; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares
prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional
representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed
minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that
entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or
equal to 10 percent (the sample median); or ,(6) shareholders have preemptive rights
that can only be waved by a shareholders’ vote. The index ranges from 0 to 6.[Source:
La Porta et al. (1998)]
• Gov_ownj− Government Ownership of Commercial Banks: Share of the as-
sets of the top 10 banks, excluding development banks, in a given country controlled
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February 2005b yt h eg o v e r n m e n ta tt h e20 percent level in 1995. A bank is controlled by the gov-
ernment if government banking is larger than 20 percent and the state is the largest
shareholder.[Source: La Porta et al. (2002)]
• Overheadj− Bank Overhead Costs: The accounting value of a bank’s overhead
costs as a share of its total assets. The data is obtained from individual bank’s balance
sheets. The measure refers to 1995. [Source: La Porta et al. (2002)]
• Bank_Soundj− Bank Soundness Measure: An index assessing the soundness of
banks in terms of their "general health and sound balance sheets." The index ranges
from 1 to 7, where higher scores indicate stronger agreement with the statement. The
score refers to the index in 1999. [Source: La Porta et al. (2002); originally from the
World Economic Forum]
• Corruptionj− Corruption: A composite index for the year 2000 that draws on 14
data sources from seven institutions: the World Economic Forum, the World Business
Environment Survey of the World Bank, the Institute of Management Development,
Pricewaterhouse Coopers, the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, the Economist
Intelligence Unit and Freedom House’s Nations in Transit. The score ranges between
0 and 10 with lower values indicating higher levels of corruption. [Source: Djankov et
al (2003)]
• Contractj− Contract Enforceability: “The relative degree to which contractual
agreements are honoured and complications presented by language and mentality dif-
ferences. Scale: 0−10 (higher scores indicating higher degree of enforceability) [Source:
Djankov et al (2003), originally from Business Environmental Risk Intelligence]
• Legal_timej− Legal Time: Estimated duration, in calendar days, between the plain-
tiﬀ ﬁles the complaint till the time the landlord repossess the property. [Source:
Djankov et al (2003)]
• Schoolingj,t− Schooling: Average years of schooling in the population aged 25 and
above. The data are reported in ﬁve-year averages. [Source: Barro and Lee (2001)]
• Life_expectj,t− Life Expectancy: Life expectancy at birth indicates the number
of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of
its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. The data has some arbitrary gaps.
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February 2005A linear interpolation is used to ﬁll in these gaps. At the regressions the variable is
entered as the natural logarithm of the interpolated series. [Source: World Bank World
Development Indicators CD-ROM (2004 Edition)].
• ER_reg1− "Fine" Exchange Rate Regime: Fine classiﬁcation of exchange rate
arrangements. Ranges from 1, indicating a "ﬁxed" exchange rate regime to 15,s u g -
gesting a freely ﬂoating exchange rate. Speciﬁcally the variable takes on the follow-
ing values:(1)=No separate legal tender; (2)=Pre announced peg or currency board
arrangement; 3=Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to
+/ − 2%; (4)=De facto peg; (5)=Pre announced crawling peg; (6)=Pre announced
crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/−2%; (7)=De factor crawling peg;
(8)=De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/ − 2%; (9)=Pre an-
nounced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/−2%; (10)= De facto crawling
band that is narrower than or equal to +/ − 5%; (11)=Moving band that is narrower
than or equal to +/−2% (i.e., allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time);
(12)=Managed ﬂoating; (13)=Freely ﬂoating; (14)=Freely falling; (15)=Dual market
in which parallel market data is missing. [Source: Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004)]
• ER_reg2− "Coarse" Exchange Rate Regime: Coarse classiﬁcation of exchange
rate arrangements. Ranges from 1, indicating a "ﬁxed" exchange rate regime to 5,s u g -
gesting a freely ﬂoating exchange rate. Speciﬁcally the variable takes on the following
values: (1): No separate legal tender, or pre announced peg or currency board arrange-
ment, or pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/−2%,o r
de facto peg; (2): Pre announced crawling peg, or pre announced crawling band that
is narrower than or equal to +/ − 2% or De factor crawling peg, or de facto crawling
band that is narrower than or equal to +/ − 2%. (3): Pre announced crawling band
t h a ti sw i d e rt h a no re q u a lt o+/−2%,or de facto crawling band that is narrower than
or equal to +/ − 5%, or moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/ − 2%,o r
managed ﬂoating. (4): Freely ﬂoating. (5): Freely falling. (6): Dual market in which
parallel market data is missing. [Source: Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004)]
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• Latitude: The absolute value of the geographical latitude of the country. Source: La
Porta et al. (1999); originally from CIA Factbook]
• Religious, Ethnic & Linguistic Fragmentation: Indicators of religious, ethnic and
linguistic heterogeneity. Constructed as one minus the Herﬁndahl index of the share
of the largest religious, ethnical, and linguistic groups. It reﬂects the probability that
two randomly selected individuals follow diﬀerent religious beliefs, belong to diﬀerent
ethnical groups, or do not speak the same language. [Source: Alesina et al. (2003)]
• Legal Origin: Identiﬁes the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial Code
of each country. There are ﬁve categories: (1) Common law; (2) French civil law; (3)
German civil law; (4) Scandinavian civil law; (5) Socialist/Communist law. [Source:
La Porta et al. (1998, 1999)]
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Composite institutions index (ICRG) in recipient country 
Bank Flows & Political Institutions 
 
Notes: Figure 1 plot the cross-time mean of the natural logarithm of international bank flows (vertical axis) against 
the mean value of the aggregate institutions index “ICRG political risk” measure in the “recipient” country  
(horizontal axis).  The dashed line gives a linear regression fit. For detailed variable definitions, sources, and 




















































2  4  6 8 10 
Corruption in recipient country 
Bank Flows & Corruption 
 
Notes: Figure 2 plots the cross-time mean of the natural logarithm of international bank flows (vertical axis) 
against corruption in the “recipient” country  (horizontal axis).  A higher value in the 0—10 corruption index 
implies lower levels of corruption. The dashed line gives a linear regression fit. For detailed variable definitions, 














































4  5  6 7 8 9 
Contact Enforceability Index in recipient country (0-10) 
Bank Flows & Legal Environment 
 
Notes: Figure3 p1ots the cross-time mean of the natural logarithm of cross-border bank flows (vertical axis) 
against contract enforceability in the recipient country  (horizontal axis). A higher value in the 0 to 10 index 
implies higher quality legal system. The dashed line gives a linear regression fit. For detailed variable definitions, 





















































0  .2  .4 .6 .8 1 
Government ownership of banks in recipient country  
Inter-Bank Flows & Government Ownership of Banks 
 
Notes: Figure 4 p1ots the cross-time mean of the natural logarithm of cross-border inter-bank bank flows (vertical 
axis) against government ownership of commercial banks in the recipient country  (horizontal axis). The dashed 
line gives a linear regression fit. For detailed variable definitions, sources, and country abbreviations see Appendix 
A and B.     
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Benchmark Regression Estimates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
















































































































































































        
Adj. R
2  0.4610 0.5172 0.5216 0.5228 0.5740 0.5487 
Observations  38688 37871 35232 35232 35232 37871 
Country-pairs  863 859 855 855 855 859 
Regional & Income Dummies  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
        
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross asset flows from country i ("source" country) to county j ("recipient" 
country) in quarter t. Absolute value of t-statistics based on robust standard errors (clustering by country pairs) are given in italics. 
a, b, c 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Estimation is performed by OLS with period fixed effects (intercepts not 
reported). The specifications in columns (5) and (6) include regional and income dummies at the recipient country (coefficients not reported). 
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Specific Institutional Characteristics  
       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
         




















































































































































































































ln Instj,t-1   1.8453
a 
(9.43) 






   1.8679
a 
(7.49) 












































ln Legal_timej         0 . 2 7 4 7
a 
(4.38) 
         
Adj. R
2  0.5293 0.5394 0.5372 0.5418 0.5632 0.5457 0.5431 
Observations  34404 34087 34087 30732 30415 30415 34087 
Country-pairs  757 757 757 596 596 596 757 
         
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross asset flows from country i ("source" country) to county j ("recipient" 
country) in quarter t. Absolute value of t-statistics based on robust standard errors (clustering by country pairs) are given in italics. 
a, b, c 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Estimation is performed by OLS with period fixed effects (intercepts not 
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Banking Sector Characteristics & Inter-Bank Flows 
 
  Aggregate Flows    Inter-Bank Flows 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
             



















































































































































































ln Instj,t-1   2.6800
a 
(10.39) 






   2.5018
a 
(10.16) 













































             
Adj. R
2  0.5041  0.5346  0.5232    0.5182 0.5438 0.5300 
Observations  35172  34748  34748    33075 32762 32762 
Country-pairs  800  799  799    708 708 708 
             
Notes: In columns (1), (2) and (3) the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross asset flows from country i ("source" country) to 
county j ("recipient" country) in quarter t. In columns (4)—(6) the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross asset flows from 
banks located in country i  (“source” country) to the banking sector only in country j (“recipient” country) in quarter t. Absolute value of t-
statistics based on robust standard errors (clustering by country pairs) are given in italics. 
a, b, c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. Estimation is performed by OLS with period fixed effects (intercepts not reported). For variable definitions and sources 
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Developed vs. Developing Countries – European Union Effect 
 
  High Income Countries    Middle & Low Income 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
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Corruptionj 
 





























    -0.8293
a 
(3.73) 
    
              
Adj. R
2  0.5332 0.5349 0.5398 0.5428    0.3687  0.3645 
Observations 22870  22870  21836  21836    12362  8579 
Country-pairs 413  413  377  377    442  219 
            
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross asset flows from country i ("source" country) to county j ("recipient" 
country) in quarter t. Absolute value of t-statistics based on robust standard errors (clustering by country pairs) are given in italics. 
a, b, c 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Estimation is performed by OLS with period fixed effects (intercepts not 
reported). In columns (1)—(4) estimation is performed only to high income countries, while in columns (5) and (6) only to low and middle 
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Risk Characteristics (Aggregate and Inter-Bank Flows) 
 
  Aggregate Flows    Inter-Bank Flows 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
             







































































ln Areai __ 
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Instj,t-1  [Political_Riskj,t-1] 0.0588
a 
(18.02) 















   0.0371
a 
(18.02) 
     -0.0011
 
(0.50) 
             
Adj. R
2  0.5633 0.5417 0.5354    0.6343  0.6338  0.6337 
Observations 35232  35232  35232    33842  33842  33842 
Country-pairs  855 855 855    819  819  819 
Fixed-Effects “Source”  “Source”    “Source”   “Recipient”  “Recipient”  “Recipient” 
             
Notes: In columns (1), (2) and (3), the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross asset flows from country i ("source" country) to 
county j ("recipient" country) in quarter t. In columns (4), (5) and (6) the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross asset flows 
from banks located in country i  (“source” country) to the banking sector only in country j (“recipient” country) in quarter t. Absolute value 
of t-statistics based on robust standard errors (clustering by country pairs) are given in italics. 
a, b, c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. Estimation is performed by OLS with period fixed effects (intercepts not reported). In columns (1)—(3) “source” 
country dummies are included, while in columns (4)—(6) “recipient” country dummies are included (intercepts not reported). For variable 
definitions and sources see Appendix B. 
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Liability Flows 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        























































































































































































































ln Insti,t-1  
 






        
Adj. R
2  0.4655 0.5496 0.5057 0.5067 0.4743 0.6349 
Observations  35257 33967 29964 29964 35457 35457 
Country-pairs  861 760 589 589 861 861 
Fixed effects  No “Source” No  No  No  “Source”  & 
“Recipient” 
        
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross liability flows from country i ("source" country) to county j ("recipient" 
country) in quarter t. Absolute value of t-statistics based on robust standard errors (clustering by country pairs) are given in italics. 
a, b, c 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Estimation is performed by OLS with period fixed effects (intercepts not 
reported).   The specification in column (2)  includes “source” country fixed-effects (intercepts not reported). The specification in column (6) 
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Sensitivity Analysis: Additional Controls  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
         


































































































































































































































































































ER_reg1j,t   
 









       - 0 . 0 7 3 4
a 
(3.03) 
         
Adj. R
2  0.5246 0.5814 0.5824 0.7853 0.5824 0.0865 0.6272 
Observations  28269 28269 25762 26067 28651 32884 28651 
Fixed-effects No  “Source”  No  “Between” No  “Within” “Source” 
         
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross asset flows from country i ("source" country) to county j ("recipient" 
country) in quarter t. Absolute value of t-statistics based on robust standard errors (clustering by country pairs) are given in italics. 
a, b, c 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Estimation is performed by OLS with period fixed effects (intercepts not 
reported). The specifications given in columns (2) and (7) include “source” country fixed-effects (intercepts not reported). In column (4) 
results from the cross-section of country-pairs is reported (“between”). Column (6) reports “fixed-effect” estimates (within). The R
2 in 
column (4) and (5) is the between and the within R
2 , respectively. For variable definitions see Appendix B. 
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Sensitivity Analysis: BIS data & Endogeneity  
 
  OLS   Tobit    IV 
  (1)  (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)  (6) 
                 























































































































































































































































   0.2903
a  





































    
 
                  
Adj. R
2  0.4036  0.0901 0.0834 0.1000    0.5305  0.5482  0.6042 
Observations  32862    39123  32521  32541    35232 34404 30732 
Left-censored 
Observations 
2130  3891  2106  2106    -  - 
 
Country-pairs             855  757  596 
Fixed-effects No    “Source”  No “Source”    No  No  “Source” 
Over-id.  (p-values)            [0.184] [0.488] [0.138] 
                 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross asset flows from country i ("source" country) to county j ("recipient" 
country) in quarter t. Absolute value of t-statistics based on robust standard errors (clustering by country pairs) are given in italics. 
a, b, c 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. In column (1) estimation is performed by OLS with period fixed effects 
(intercepts not reported). In columns (2),  (3) and (4) estimation is performed with Tobit (maximum likelihood). The pseudo-R
2. (defined as 
one minus the ratio of the full model to the constant-only log-likelihoods) is reported. Columns (5)-- (7) report instrumental variables (IV) 
estimates.  The last row reports the p-value of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. The instrument set for the composite 
institutions-political risk is latitude, ethnical, religious, and linguistic fragmentation. Corruption in column (6) is instrumented with religious, 
ethnical, and linguistic fragmentation. Anti_directj and Contractj in column (7) are being instrumented with legal origin dummies.  For 
variable definitions see Appendix B. 
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Sample Sensitivity Analysis  
 
   Instj,t-1  Corruptionj 
 




           
Panel A 
 (a)  0.0574
a   
(15.73) 
__ __ __ __ 













 (c)  0.0339
















a   
(15.51) 
__ __ __ __ 





























 (a)  0.0436
a   
(10.35) 

















 (c)  0.0212

















a   
(14.13) 



































a   
(13.18) 
__ __ __ __ 
































  (a) 0.05587
a   
(16.43) 































Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of gross asset flows from country i ("source" country) to county j ("recipient" 
country) in quarter t. Absolute value of t-statistics based on robust standard errors (clustering by country pairs) are given in italics. 
a, b, c 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Not recorded independent variables: ln Yi,t; ln Yj,t; ln Popi,t; ln Popj,t; ln 
Areai; ln Areaj; ln Disti,j; Tiei,j; Ratei,t; Infj,t For variable definitions see Appendix B. 
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